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Social dialogue is a key part of the European social model, with European social
dialogue having been launched at the historic Val Duchesse meeting 30 years ago.
However, since then, established approaches to social dialogue in Europe have
been challenged by industrial and social change. Ongoing shifts towards greater
decentralisation of collective bargaining have resulted in a polarisation of Member
States and the crisis has resulted in an increased trend towards unilateral decision-
making by governments at the expense of social partners’ autonomy. In response to
these challenges, the new Juncker Commission has set about a ‘relaunching’ of
social dialogue. This issue of Foundation Focus looks at the current state of play of
social dialogue in Europe, focusing in particular on Eurofound’s extensive research
findings from both its Europe-wide surveys and its observatories. 
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IN THIS ISSUE
Editorial
Collective industrial relations, including social dialogue, have undergone dramatic
change over recent decades, with a shift to predominantly service or knowledge
economies, greater individualisation in society at large, and the growth of female
employment and changing gender roles bringing issues of work–life balance, care
arrangements and working-time patterns to the table. And economic change is a key
driver of the role of social dialogue. After the financial crisis of 2008, the issue of
European social dialogue slipped down the policy agenda in the face of more immediate
economic concerns. Strengthening social dialogue to enable social partners to address
socioeconomic issues in Europe more effectively has, from its outset, been a declared
key task of the new Juncker Commission. 
Over the first half of 2015, European social dialogue received much greater attention,
with key players at EU and national level coming together for three major events. On
5 March, a high-level summit in Brussels brought together the EU-level cross-industry
and sectoral social partners together with the European Commission to discuss ways to
strengthen social dialogue. On 19 March, the Tripartite Social Summit looked at the
contribution of the social partners to investing in growth and creating jobs. And on
21–22 April in Riga, an informal meeting of EU Ministers for Employment and Social
Affairs held as part of the Latvian Presidency examined the role and future development
of social dialogue. 
The challenges are clear: in an interview in this issue, Head of Unit for Social Dialogue
and Industrial Relations at the Commission’s DG Employment, David-Pascal Dion says:
‘Only a reinforced partnership of the main European actors can preserve the European
project.’ In the framework of the European Semester, the Commission calls for
strengthening social partners’ involvement in the design and implementation of policies
and reforms at national level. If European social dialogue is to operate fully, the EU and
its Member States must support both the dialogue itself and national players in the field
of industrial relations.  
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The new European Commission under
President Jean-Claude Juncker is
committed to relaunching social
dialogue: a first step was taken with
the organisation of a high-level
conference in Brussels on 5 March
2015. The aim of the conference was
to discuss concrete ways to strengthen
social dialogue with EU cross-industry
social partners and their national
affiliates. On 21 and 22 April 2015,
Ministers for Employment and Social
Affairs in Riga again discussed –
informally – ways towards a
committed, realistic social dialogue.
From 1985 onwards, at the initiative of
then European Communities President,
Jacques Delors, social dialogue took on a
more autonomous and bipartite form in
the preparatory phase of the Single
Market. This fundamental change dates
from 31 January 1985, when EU-level
social partners met at the château of Val
Duchesse in Brussels. It was Delors’ firm
conviction that the Single Market
programme had to be matched by a social
dimension to the European Community;
the cornerstone of this Social Europe
would be European social dialogue. Thirty
years later, many academic experts and
EU actors now argue that it could be
made more efficient and effective.
Towards more autonomy
The principle of ‘autonomy of the social
partners’ is embedded in most of the legal
systems of the EU and has been
recognised as one of the general
principles of EU law. However, recent
Eurofound research has shown that one
impact of the crisis on industrial relations
has been an increased trend towards
unilateral decision-making by
governments at the expense of social
partners’ autonomy, especially in the
public sector (Eurofound, 2013a). EU
social partners stress the importance of
their collective bargaining autonomy;
trade union representatives – in particular
– voice their concern about what they
perceive as interference by EU institutions
in national-level wage determination and
wage policy. Society works better if
citizens feel that decisions concerning
them are taken at the most appropriate
level – in line with the principle of
subsidiarity. When social partners arrive
at common solutions, these often have a
better chance of succeeding, because they
have more support and are often more
realistic. A firmer application of the
principle of subsidiarity seems to be the
right way to strengthen social dialogue.
Greater representativeness
and legitimacy
Under European social dialogue,
management and labour have developed
into co-legislators in the social policy
field; the representativeness checks that
the European Commission carries out are
very important in ensuring the legitimacy
of the actors in this process. In 2006,
Eurofound was mandated by the
Commission to assess the
representativeness of the European social
partners; since then, it has published 38
sectoral studies (and one cross-industry
study) in order to underpin the legitimacy
of that dialogue. These studies map the
relevant EU social partners that should be
consulted by the Commission.
Need for better linkages
Within European social dialogue, the
number and scope of policy proposals
depend on whether the European
Commission considers these initiatives a
priority for the EU. The EU’s progress in
this field is – in turn – contingent on the
degree of support from other EU
institutions and Member States, and on
the social partners themselves. This is
why one commentator famously
interpreted European social dialogue as
an industrial relations process
characterised as ‘bargaining in the
shadow of the law’ (Bercusson, 1995).
However, the shadow of the law seems to
have faded over the past decade – as has
the incentive of both sides of industry to
engage in effective dialogue.
Furthermore, a crucial dimension of social
dialogue is the relationship between
European-level social partners and their
national affiliates: the future of social
dialogue at EU level depends on the
ability of social partners to increase the
flow of information and degree of
cooperation between these two. If
European social dialogue is to operate
fully, the EU and its Member States must
support both the dialogue itself and
national players in the field of industrial
relations.
Rebuilding mutual trust
Social dialogue is based on discussion
and mutual learning. The Val Duchesse
process created a dynamic by building up
both a relationship of trust between the
actors (based on their having better
information about each other’s
capabilities and intentions) and a
commitment to engage in negotiations at
EU level. Past interviews with actors with
interests at the EU level have shown that
‘learning’ is a key factor in the process. In
the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis,
it may be time to revisit the spirit of Val
Duchesse and rebuild that relationship of
trust between the two sides of industry.
Closer involvement
At EU level, the involvement of the social
partners in the European Semester
process has improved at the different
junctures. The European social partners
are now consulted prior to the publication
of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and
the 2015 AGS proposes to further engage
with the social partners beforehand and to
discuss and receive feedback on emerging
trends or topical country-specific issues.
Since this year, the country reports are
published three months earlier in order to
allow for a better discussion of the reports
3
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with the social partners and other
stakeholders at national level. The
Employment, Social Policy, Health and
Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) has
discussed the involvement of the social
partners and endorsed the Employment
Committee (EMCO) guidelines, which
could be  followed by the Social
Protection Committee (SPC) as well. In a
move initiated under the Italian
Presidency, the European social partners
now participate directly in discussions at
the informal meetings of the EU ministers
for Employment and Social Affairs. The
European social partners have welcomed
this recent practice and the dialogue with
EMCO and SPC as advisory policy
committees for EPSCO. 
Another innovation within the Semester
process is the creation of European
Semester Officers – economic policy
experts based in the European
Commission’s national representation
offices in the 28 Member States. Their role
is to explain the European Semester and
the new economic governance to the
various stakeholders, including the social
partners, at national level. However, there
also seems to be a general consensus
among the actors (EU institutions and
European social partners) that despite
recent progress an even closer
involvement of the social partners both in
the European and national strands of the
European Semester is needed.
Social market economy
The European social model – of which
social dialogue is a central pillar – has
been challenged over the course of the
crisis. Recent attempts to strengthen the
social dimension of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) have addressed
some initial design weaknesses to make it
fairer, more competitive and capable of
promoting growth. On the 30th
anniversary of the Val Duchesse
conference, both Vice-President of the
European Commission Valdis
Dombrovskis and Commissioner for
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and
Labour Mobility Marianne Thyssen
reiterated that social dialogue was a
prerequisite for a social market economy
and crucial to both competitiveness and
fairness. The genuine and committed
involvement of the social partners is
needed for a fresh start to that dialogue.
Christian Welz
Recently appointed Head of Unit for
Social Dialogue and Industrial
Relations at the European
Commission’s Directorate General for
Employment, Social Affairs and
Inclusion, David-Pascal Dion
discusses the Commission’s firm
commitment to strengthening dialogue
with social partners across Europe
and its role in recent initiatives to
reignite social dialogue.
Eurofound: Recent research by the
Commission and Eurofound has shown
that social dialogue came under stress
in a number of Member States during
the crisis – in particular, in the
so-called ‘programme countries’.
What can be done to improve the
functioning of social dialogue at
Member State level?
David-Pascal Dion: Certainly, we have
seen that during the later stages of the
crisis social dialogue came under strain in
many Member States. As also shown in
the 2014 edition of Industrial Relations in
Europe, the impact has been particularly
strong in countries that have received
financial assistance. In view of the acute
economic pressure, achieving a broad
consensus on the necessary reform
measures has often proved difficult.
Governments have more often taken
measures unilaterally.
In the framework of the European
Semester, the Commission calls for
strengthening social partners’ involvement
in the design and implementation of
policies and reforms at national level.
National social partners need a certain
degree of capacity to represent their
respective interests and to coordinate
their work. In a significant number of
Member States, more support for
capacity-building is needed, while social
partners and public authorities from other
Member States can usefully share their
good practice in a process of mutual
learning. The Commission also provides
financial support to strengthen industrial
relations at national level – in particular,
through the European Social Fund.
Some voices from among the academic
world and the social partners have
argued that European social dialogue
did not deliver to its full potential in
the past. Do you agree?
First of all, it should be noted that there is
not one single European social dialogue.
Social dialogue at the European level is
quite varied, with both cross-industry
committees and 43 sectoral social
dialogue committees that have been
active in past decades, delivering a broad
range of outcomes including autonomous
agreements and agreements that were
implemented by Council Directives.
However, the Commission agrees that
social dialogue at European level could
contribute more to addressing the key
challenges facing the European labour
market and economy. This is why
President Juncker has said that he wishes
to be ‘the President of social dialogue’
and his Commission has taken these
steps to give the social dialogue a fresh
start.
What steps have been taken so far and
what is planned for the ‘renaissance’
of a genuine and effective European
social dialogue?
Many steps have in fact been taken, and
I feel that we have hit the ground running.
In the first months of its mandate, this
Commission launched the process of the
new start for social dialogue with a high-
level event that brought together leaders
of national social partner organisations
from all across Europe.1 Some 30 years
after the launching of European social
dialogue by President Delors and four
INTERVIEW WITH
DAVID-PASCAL DION
‘Only a reinforced
partnership of the
main European actors
can preserve the
European project.’
1 The event took place on 5 March 2015 in Brussels.
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members of the College of Commissioners
at Val Duchesse, the new start for social
dialogue initiated by President Juncker
and four other members of the College
highlighted the importance of this process
to the Commission. 
The new start process is organised around
two key themes: involvement of social
partners in economic governance and
support for capacity-building; and the
contribution of social partners to policy
and law-making.
As regards economic governance, the
European social partners have already
been more closely involved in the
discussions during this year’s European
Semester. Earlier publication of the
country reports allowed the Commission,
the national authorities and the
employment and social protection
committees to engage in an exchange with
the social partners before the country-
specific recommendations (CSRs) were
issued. The March 2015 Employment
Guidelines – a document that sets the
direction of the coordination of
employment policy – emphasise the need
for the Member States to closely involve
social partners in designing and
implementing relevant reforms and
policies and to support an improved
functioning and effectiveness of social
dialogue at national level. The efforts
undertaken by Member States in this
regard will need to be reflected in next
year’s Semester – for instance, in their
national reform programmes.
The Commission is also keen for the
social partners to be more involved in
policy and law-making. In consulting the
social partners, we want to go beyond the
statutory consultation requirements, set
out in Articles 154 and 155 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). We have organised
dedicated consultation hearings on key
employment and social policy dossiers,
such as integration of the long-term
unemployed or the labour mobility
package. But we also wish to involve
social partners in areas that do not fall
within the employment or social portfolio
but that have social and employment
impacts – for example, the Investment
Plan, the Energy Union, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),
the Digital Single Market, and so on.
Meetings with EU social partners on these
topics have already taken place, including
with European Commissioners and
Vice-Presidents. 
Finally, we will continue to look for ways
to support and strengthen social dialogue
at national level through capacity-
building. On 14 October 2015, as part of
the ‘Open Days’ in Brussels, we are
organising a workshop on the use of EU
funds in supporting capacity-building. We
will also look into ways to foster mutual
learning with a view to further improving
the functioning and effectiveness of social
dialogue at national level. 
A more detailed discussion on how to
follow up on the new start is taking place
in the two Thematic Working Groups
dedicated to the two key themes with the
participation of social partners
representing all levels, representatives of
Member States and of the Commission, as
well as colleagues from Eurofound. 
Where do you see a role for Eurofound
in this relaunch of the social dialogue
process?
Eurofound is a key partner in providing
input in relation to the new start for social
dialogue. With its tripartite structure and
extensive expertise in industrial relations
research, we count on Eurofound’s
support – particularly in terms of
delivering on the country-specific
information, which we need in the context
of the European Semester. I would also
underline the importance of the
representativeness studies carried out by
Eurofound; these are essential to ensure
the proper functioning of European social
dialogue.2 Similarly, the recent research
done by Eurofound on the concept of
representativeness at national and at EU
levels will provide useful material to
deepen our knowledge and understanding
of a key feature of social dialogue. 
You have recently been appointed
Head of Unit for Social Dialogue and
Industrial Relations at the European
Commission’s Employment
Directorate-General. What are the
main objectives you would like to
achieve in this role?
In my previous jobs in DG EMPL
[as Head of Unit responsible for
Coordination, Planning and
Inter-institutional relations and earlier as
assistant to successive Directors General],
I actually followed several social dialogue
files. I have, for instance, vivid memories
of a discussion with M. Monti, R. Verrue,
J. Monks and P. de Buck on the social
dimension in the draft Monti Report on
the relaunch of the single market.
When I took up my new job – after
President Juncker announced that he
wanted to be the President of social
dialogue – I looked back at the launch of
social dialogue, 30 years ago, by
President Delors and at all its
achievements, including its formal
recognition in the EU Treaties. 
Since 1985, the European landscape has
changed dramatically. Globalisation,
together with technological, demographic
and environmental changes, all imply an
adaptation of our European social model.
Only a reinforced partnership of the main
European actors can preserve the
European project.
Social partners are key actors to ensure a
more equitable and a more efficient social
market economy. Not properly involving
social partners in the design and
implementation of reforms and policies
runs the risk of failure and of ineffective
and unfair outcomes.
Therefore, my main objective with the
new start for social dialogue is to place
social dialogue (European and national,
cross-industry and sectoral, bipartite and
tripartite) back at the centre of the
discussions and of the solutions for a
fairer and more effective European Union. 
And I hope that, in 30 years’ time, our
successors won’t feel the need for a new
‘new start’.  
Interview: Christian Welz
5
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At the heart of industrial relations
systems, collective bargaining plays
an important role in the functioning of
national economies and sectors, as
well as in the social fabric of Member
States and the European Union.
Diversity – in terms of the actors and
parties involved in negotiations, rules
of procedure, topics on the agenda,
outcomes and legal effects of the
agreements – is widely acknowledged
as one of its key features.
Collective bargaining systems and
practices in the EU have come under
some pressure in recent years, particularly
following the financial and economic
crisis in 2008. However, apart from a few
exceptional cases of stability, many EU
Member States were undergoing
significant changes in their systems and
practices of collective bargaining before
the crisis. In addition, even with regard to
long-standing, common trends such as
decentralisation, these changes differ
markedly at national level – in terms of
pace, content and coordination and in the
role played by the government. Recent
research from Eurofound traces major
trends and developments in collective
bargaining in Europe from the late 1990s
to the present. Some of the key findings
are outlined here.
Acceleration of change
There has been a process of steady
change in collective bargaining systems
since the late 1990s; this has accelerated
since 2008, affecting all countries and not
just those that experienced the crisis’
most obvious social and labour market
effects. In fact, the significant shifts
towards more decentralised bargaining
systems in many Member States started in
a context of relative stability before the
crisis, with countries in southern Europe
catching up on developments that had
already unfolded in other countries.
Significantly, while the decentralisation of
multilevel bargaining systems and
practices in the Nordic countries and
western continental Europe had been
implemented gradually in a coordinated
way – mostly based on tripartite
consultation and concertation – before
2008, the shift in countries such as
Greece, Portugal, Romania and Spain has
been much more abrupt and disorganised,
with the changes often imposed
unilaterally by governments. 
Process of fragmentation
This process (often described as
‘individualisation’ or ‘fragmentation’) is
widespread. It has taken place in those
Member States that have introduced more
flexibility into their multilevel bargaining
processes by implementing mechanisms
to allow deviations from sector-level
collective bargaining agreements (such as
limiting or preventing extension
mechanisms or allowing temporary or
permanent opt-outs) and to orientate
wage negotiation towards company level.
Fragmentation also has taken place in
countries, such as the central and eastern
European Member States, where
bargaining processes were predominantly
implemented at company level. And it has
become a more visible reality in those
countries that until the 2008 crisis had
resisted the trend.
The common trend towards
decentralisation and flexibility in
collective bargaining processes has not
been totally uniform. There have been
moves in different – even opposing –
directions. To understand these divergent
developments, it is important to consider
the differences in the point of departure
(particularly the degree of flexibility from
the company point of view), the
organisational strength and influence of
key actors, and external pressure (such as
unemployment, competition and the
financial state of companies). Despite all
these asymmetries, however, the
underlying trends fundamentally stem
from an increasing economic pressure on
companies, sectors and countries and the
need to adjust labour costs and improve
productivity.
Growing polarisation 
The already existing differences between
collective bargaining regimes have
widened since 2008. These differences
arise from distinct industrial relations
models: those in which social partners’
organisational strength is comparatively
high, social dialogue structures, practices
and institutions are stable and influential,
and the collective bargaining agenda is
broad; and those in which actors,
processes and outcomes are weaker.
Perhaps the most dramatic indicator of
growing discrepancies is to the substantial
change in the distribution of collective
bargaining coverage rates among
countries since the late 1990s. When
countries are grouped by degree of
coverage, a pattern emerges of growing
polarisation between national collective
bargaining systems. The group with the
highest coverage rate (of more than 80%
of the labour force) has remained
relatively stable, comprising Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden over
the entire period. A second group, with a
high rate of coverage of between 60% and
80%, at the end of the 1990s comprised
Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal and Romania. This
level of coverage has eroded significantly
during the period; today, only four
countries achieve it: Croatia, Italy, Malta
and Portugal. 
The group of countries with a collective
bargaining coverage rate below 40% has
experienced the strongest growth in
numbers (from six to eleven). In the late
1990s it comprised Bulgaria, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and the UK; it
now also comprises Greece, Ireland,
Poland, Romania and Slovakia. As a
result of this transformation of the
collective bargaining landscape, four out
of ten employees in the EU today are not
covered by collective agreements, as the
figure shows.
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Towards unilateralism and
more EU input
Over the past 15 years, the interventions
made by governments in collective
bargaining have varied considerably in
their extent and orientation; however,
there has been a tendency towards
governmental unilateralism – and not
only in the so-called ‘crisis’ countries.
In addition, the European Semester
process, taking place within the
framework of European economic
governance, has over recent years brought
about a paradigm shift away from non-
intervention in collective bargaining
towards a more proactive EU approach of
guiding and recommending reforms that
encourage decentralisation and
company-level flexibility. 
Varying patterns of change
The table shows the aggregate impact of
change on collective bargaining according
to a widely known typology, which
classifies countries by the nature of their
industrial relations system. Although a
more detailed assessment may show
variance from case to case, what is
apparent is the diversity and growing
polarisation within the Centre-West,
South and Central-East clusters. This
diversity is particularly notable, in the
Central-East cluster, ranging as it does
from countries where stability has
prevailed to those where change has had
a strong impact. 
Since the end of the 1990s, three general
patterns of change have affected the
industrial relations clusters quite
differently.
Gradual adaptation: This characterises
all countries in the North cluster and most
in the Centre-West group (apart from
Germany), as well as the majority of
countries in the South and Central-East
clusters. This pattern includes situations
as in Finland (with temporary
recentralisation activity) and other
countries with mixed experiences
(Lithuania and Croatia). 
Accelerated change: This pattern
characterises a much smaller group of
countries consisting of Germany (with
different trends before and after 2008),
Portugal and three Central-East countries.
Crisis-induced change: This describes
an abrupt pattern of change – mainly in
terms of decentralisation – in those
countries in the South and Central-East
clusters (and Ireland) that were most
severely hit by the crisis. 
7
Comparison of collective bargaining coverage rates in EU Member States, 
1997–1999 and 2011–2013
Cluster Patterns of change
Low impact Some impact Significant impact Strong impact
Gradual adaptation Accelerated change Crisis-induced change
North Denmark, Norway Sweden, Finland — —
Centre-West Austria, Luxembourg,
Netherlands
Belgium Germany —
UK, Ireland UK — — Ireland 
South Malta France, Italy, Croatia Portugal Greece, Spain
Central-East Estonia, Poland Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Latvia,
Lithuania
Bulgaria, Slovakia,
Slovenia
Romania, Hungary 
Patterns of change in industrial relations systems in the EU
Source: Based on contributions provided by Eurofound’s network of European correspondents
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Notes: For 1997–1999, the EU average was 68%; by 2011–2013, it had dropped to 61%.
Sources: European Commission (2013 and 2015a). Data based on ICTWSS Database, Version 4.0
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Challenges ahead 
According to the views of the national
partners consulted, there is a general
climate of uncertainty and a growing
feeling of standing at a crossroads with
regard to the future of collective
bargaining. At the same time, it is widely
acknowledged that collective bargaining
provides a solid foundation for progress
and growth in the EU Member States –
not only due to its central function of
setting wages and working conditions, but
also as an intangible value of industrial
relations. This shared value builds up
mutual trust between actors, eases the
settling of labour and industrial disputes,
and contributes to general
macroeconomic development at national
level and to the performance of business. 
Collective bargaining has been shown to
have important potential in increasing
sector and company competitiveness and
productivity and in enabling business to
adapt to global challenges such as
technological change. In order to foster
this potential in accomplishing the
development of the EU single market,
policymakers should take action to
support collective bargaining as an
important asset of the EU social model.
Ricardo Rodriguez Contreras 
How has the crisis impacted on social
dialogue in workplaces? Findings from
Eurofound’s third European Company
Survey show that, despite the crisis,
many workplaces in Europe have
managed to retain their
well-functioning social dialogue
practices. In fact, companies where
social dialogue is working well report
better company performance and
overall workplace well-being.
However, the research points to a
sizeable minority of companies where
social dialogue is characterised by a
lack of resources, poor trust between
management and employee
representatives, and relatively high
levels of industrial action.
Representation structures
According to the third European Company
Survey, structures for workplace social
dialogue are found in only about a third of
establishments with 10 or more employees
in the EU28: just 32% of establishments
have an official structure for employee
representation, and 26% of establishments
are a member of an employers’
organisation, or part of a company that is
(Eurofound, 2015d). In this respect,
differences between countries are huge.
The Nordic countries have relatively high
levels of organisation of both labour and
capital (generally, it is found that higher
levels of organisation of workers coincides
with higher levels of organisation of
employers). However, and worryingly, in a
relatively large group of countries –
including the Czech Republic, Greece,
Hungary, Latvia, Malta and the UK – only
a small minority of establishments have
structures for employee representation and
are members of employers’ organisations.
Size differences play a significant role, with
small and medium-sized establishments
being much less likely to have an official
employee representation or to be a
member of an employers’ organisation.
Collective bargaining
coverage
The absence of an employee
representation at the workplace level does
not necessarily mean that the workers in
the establishment are entirely
unrepresented. Collective bargaining can
take place at various levels and higher-
level collective bargaining (at the
national, sectoral or company level) is
likely to impact on the establishment as
well. The survey results show that,
overall, employees in 67% of
establishments are covered by one or
more collective wage agreements: 30% of
establishments are covered by a
company-level collective wage agreement,
29% by a sectoral or regional-level
agreement, 23% by a cross-sectoral
agreement and 21% by an agreement
negotiated for workers in a specific
occupation. 
Employee representatives
In establishments where there is a
structure for workplace social dialogue,
the vast majority of employee
representatives report having sufficient
time to carry out their duties. Smaller
proportions report having received
training for their duties (32%) and having
access to external advice (37%). As would
be expected, given the obligations arising
from the Information and Consultation
Directive (European Parliament, 2002), a
large majority of employee representatives
report having received information on the
financial situation of the establishment
(75%) and on its employment situation
(80%). Again, information provision is
better in larger establishments, and
country differences are quite pronounced. 
In just over half of all establishments, the
employee representation is involved in
joint decision-making on important
decisions. However, in around one-third
of establishments, the employee
representation is not involved in, or only
informed about, important decisions.
Similarly, around half of the employee
representatives (52%) report having had
at least some influence on the most
important decision taken in the
establishment in recent years. Some
17% report having a strong influence,
leaving 31% not having any influence
at all. 
Trust: a key
element in effective
social dialogue
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Relationships of trust
In order to capture the degree of trust
between management and employee
representation, two separate indices were
constructed. The ‘Trust in management’
index is based on the employee
representative’s assessment of the
management’s trustworthiness, their
general relationship with management,
their perception of the management’s
sincerity and whether or not they felt they
were treated less favourably because of
their position as employee representative.
The ‘Trust in employee representation’
index is based on the manager’s
assessment of the employee
representation’s trustworthiness, their
view on whether the involvement of the
employee representation is constructive,
and whether or not consulting the
employee representation in important
changes leads to greater staff commitment
to the implementation of changes. 
The figure shows a clear positive
association between trust in management
and trust in the employee representation,
implying that trust is likely to be mutual.
The exceptions are Austria – where
average levels of trust in employee
representation are high and average levels
of trust in management are low – and
Cyprus, Hungary and Italy, where the
reverse pattern is found. Where mutual
trust between management and employee
representation is low, industrial action is
found to be more prevalent. Overall, 16%
of employee representatives reported that
some type of industrial action had taken
place at their establishments in the three
years preceding the survey. 
Towards ‘win-win’ outcomes
In order to gain an insight into the way in
which practices with regard to social
dialogue are combined at the workplace
level, establishments were grouped
together based on similarities in the
resourcing of employee representatives,
provision of information, extent of
involvement of the employee
representation, level of influence of the
employee representation, trust in
management, trust in the employee
representation and industrial action. 
Four types of establishment were
identified. In establishments of the
‘Extensive and trusting’ type (39%),
employee representatives are well
resourced and highly involved, levels of
trust are high, and industrial action is
rare. In establishments of the ‘Moderate
and trusting’ type (26%), employee
representatives are moderately resourced
and involvement and influence are
limited; nevertheless, levels of trust are
high. In establishments of the ‘Extensive
and conflictual’ type (25%), employee
representatives are well resourced and
highly involved and have moderate levels
of influence; however, levels of trust are
low, and industrial action is relatively
prevalent. Finally, in establishments of the
‘Limited and conflictual’ type (10%),
employee representatives lack resources
and information and have little influence.
In addition, levels of trust are low, and
industrial action is relatively common.
Size of establishment and sector make a
difference: the prevalence of the
‘Moderate and trusting’ type increases as
establishment size decreases; in contrast,
the prevalence of the ‘Extensive and
conflictual’ type increases as
establishment size increases. The
‘Extensive and trusting’ and ‘Moderate
and trusting’ types are more prevalent in
the services sectors than in construction,
industry and transport. The transport
sector stands out with a relatively high
proportion of establishments of the
‘Extensive and conflictual’ type. Country
differences are large but there is no
clear-cut pattern, except that both the
9
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conflictual types of social dialogue are
much more prevalent in Spain than in the
other countries.
Establishments of the ‘Extensive and
trusting’ type are most likely to achieve
‘win–win’ outcomes, scoring highest in
terms of both establishment performance
and workplace well-being. Establishments
of the ‘Moderate and trusting’ type score
slightly lower on performance and well-
being than the first type, but these
difference are not statistically significant.
Both of the types characterised by a
conflictual environment score significantly
lower in terms of both performance and
well-being. 
Future investment
The analyses show that establishments
where social dialogue practices are
characterised by relatively high levels of
mutual trust score better on both
establishment performance and
workplace well-being. In general, social
dialogue practices are more strongly
associated with differences in
performance and well-being than other
workplace practices, such as practices
with regard to work organisation and
human resource management. However,
win–win outcomes are not guaranteed
even when favourable practices are in
place. Institutions and context matter and
the effectiveness of practices depends on
the wider conditions in which
establishments find themselves. It also
should be noted that only a minority of
establishments actually have structures
for workplace social dialogue in place –
and this proportion is likely to have
decreased in recent years due to the
recession. In this respect, also, country
differences are very large. There is no
doubt, therefore, that more investment is
needed in both the quality and extent of
social dialogue at the workplace level.
Gijs van Houten
Collective industrial relations,
including social dialogue, have
undergone dramatic change over
recent decades. This article looks at
the current state of play of social
dialogue, examines the trend towards
further decentralisation in collective
bargaining across many countries and
assesses the impact of the crisis and
the new European economic
governance on collective bargaining
and wage-setting.
Social dialogue in flux
The Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) establishes and
institutionalises social dialogue at EU
level on the basis of Articles 154 and 155.
A distinction is drawn between cross-
industry social dialogue and European
sectoral social dialogue, and between
tripartite and bipartite social dialogue. In
the Laeken Declaration of December
2001, the European social partners
clarified the conceptual differences
between tripartite concertation,
consultation and social dialogue. The
topics of bipartite social dialogue derive
from the work programmes adopted by
the social partners. 
With regard to agreements concluded by
the EU-level social partners, the TFEU
distinguishes between agreements
implemented by Council decision or by
procedures and practices specific to
management and labour in the Member
States (Article 155 (2)). A key
characteristic of the latter, also called
‘autonomous agreements’, is that these
texts have to be implemented in
accordance with procedures and practices
specific to management and labour and
the Member States. 
This governance necessitates a
functioning social dialogue at European
and national level. Strengthening of the
interaction between the European and
other levels of social dialogue, effective
industrial relations systems and strong
social partner capacities at national level
are considered crucial for ensuring proper
implementation of these agreements
(EESC, 2014). 
Outcomes
To date, the European social dialogue has
delivered eight cross-industry, one multi-
sectoral and 11 sectoral agreements. Parts
of academia and EU actors argue that the
EU sectoral social dialogue, in particular
(which has adopted more than 700 texts
in 43 sectors over the past decades, but
concluded only 11 agreements), could be
rendered more efficient and effective. In
total, the number of agreements signed
equates to less than 2% of the texts signed
in the European social dialogue. The
recent controversy about the hairdressers’
agreement has additionally fuelled this
debate. The Commission has not taken
any decision to date and the social
partners in the meantime have
announced an initiative to revise the 2012
agreement (Eurofound, 2015b). 
Collective industrial relations, including
social dialogue, have undergone dramatic
change over recent decades. Fordist mass-
production in industrial economies has
given way to more varied production
models in predominantly service or
knowledge economies. There has been a
rise of individualisation in society at large
– affecting the self-perception of the
workforce and their attitudes towards
both their work and the collective
institutions which represent their
interests. The growth of female
employment and changing gender roles
have brought new emphasis to issues of
work–life balance, care arrangements and
working-time patterns as topics for social
dialogue. And the flexibility needs of
companies and workers have come on to
the agenda of social dialogue. 
10 / Foundation Focus / issue 17 / September 2015
Towards a fresh
start for European
social dialogue
‘It would be great if, in ten years’ time, we could already be in the history books for
having managed to give a fresh start to social dialogue after the crisis.’
Marianne Thyssen, Social Agenda No. 39, December 2014 
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Parties involved
Taken together, these factors have
contributed to at least a partial de-
standardisation of employment relations,
which has posed a major challenge to the
traditional actors in industrial relations:
their role has been questioned not only in
the practical sense of declining
membership strength and organisational
density, but in the reduced political
acceptance of their role and of the
legislative underpinnings of the work they
do and the agreements they reach.
A number of factors appear to be
important for effective social dialogue: the
support of the public authorities; the
autonomy of the negotiating parties; and
the trust between the parties. The support
of the public authorities can take very
different forms – logistical and technical
support for the actors, providing political
incentives to the parties to engage in
dialogue, and giving legislative support to
extend and generalise the outcome of
negotiations. Examples of all of these can
be found at both European and national
level, although recent developments have
generally been to restrict or end such
support. 
The autonomy of the negotiating parties is
seen by the social partners themselves as
of crucial importance and this is reflected
in different ways in the various national
settings and at European level. Clearly,
the European social partners have
concerns that some of the procedures of
the new European economic governance
have undermined their autonomy, and
this has implications for the degree of
trust among the parties. Past experience
has demonstrated, however, that a
‘virtuous’ cycle of interactions between
social partners and public authorities is
possible, in which bilateral exchange and
the interventions of the public authorities
bring the negotiating parties to
understand that engaging in dialogue
offers the best prospects of reaching their
goals.
Social dialogue in the
context of the crisis 
In the early phase of the crisis
(2008–2010), some EU Member States
with robust industrial relations systems
were in a better position to weather the
economic and social impact of the crisis
(Eurofound, 2012a). In the second phase
of the crisis (2011–2014), however, there
were many significant impacts on a range
of aspects of industrial relations in the
Member States, although in some cases it
is hard to disentangle the impact of the
crisis from other developments, such as
longer-standing national industrial
relations trends (or ‘megatrends’). The
impact of the crisis has not been even
across all groups or sectors. Even in
Member States that have emerged
relatively unscathed from the crisis, such
as Austria, it is reported that the impact
has been most severe on young and older
workers (Eurofound, 2013b). 
Move towards decentralisation
Another – if not the clearest – result of the
Eurofound research has been a multi-
country trend towards further
decentralisation in collective bargaining
(see table). The late Franz Traxler
distinguished between ‘organised’ and
‘disorganised’ decentralisation (Traxler,
1995). Organised decentralisation refers
to increased company-level bargaining
within the framework of rules and
standards set by (inter)sectoral
agreements, whereas disorganised
decentralisation takes place outside such
a regulatory framework of bargaining
coordination. It could be argued that
decentralisation has been in train for
some decades now, and that the crisis has
merely accelerated the process, owing to
the need for more flexibility and more
tailoring of agreements to companies’
individual circumstances. 
The only countries identified with a
definite trend towards centralisation have
been Finland and, to a limited extent,
Belgium. In the Nordic and central-
western European industrial relations
regimes, decentralisation, if it has
happened, has taken place in a more
organised manner, whereas in the
Member States under macroeconomic
adjustment programmes, disorganised
decentralisation seems to prevail. In some
of the Member States, the combined effect
of more unilateral decision-making by
governments and decentralisation of
collective bargaining has led to less multi-
employer bargaining and a drop in
collective bargaining coverage. In the
central and eastern European industrial
relations systems, a drift towards more
voluntary and less tripartite or less neo-
corporatist structures and processes
seems to have taken place (Glassner,
2013). A decentralised national social
dialogue also impacts on its European
counterpart, especially when it comes to
the implementation of autonomous
agreements in accordance with the
procedures and practices specific to
management and labour and the Member
States (Article 155(2) TFEU).
New social actors
Some Member States, particularly those
in the most difficult financial
circumstances, have seen the emergence
of new social movements and industrial
relations actors, such as the 15-M
movement in Spain. In Greece, recent
11
2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013
Austria MEB MEB Germany MEB MEB Norway MEB MEB
Belgium MEB MEB Greece MEB MEB Poland SEB SEB
Bulgaria Mixed Mixed Hungary SEB SEB Portugal MEB MEB
Croatia* MEB MEB Ireland MEB SEB Romania MEB SEB
Cyprus Mixed Mixed Italy MEB MEB Slovakia Mixed Mixed
Czech Republic SEB SEB Latvia SEB SEB Slovenia MEB MEB
Denmark MEB MEB Lithuania SEB SEB Spain MEB MEB
Estonia SEB SEB Luxembourg MEB MEB Sweden MEB MEB
Finland MEB MEB Malta SEB SEB United Kingdom SEB SEB
France MEB MEB Netherlands MEB MEB
Notes: *Croatia is not included in the ICTWSS, and for 2011 has been coded on the basis of the EurWORK country profile. MEB = Multi-employer bargaining (sector and/or
the cross-sector level is predominant); SEB = Single-employer bargaining (establishment or company level is predominant). Countries that experienced a change in
bargaining regime are shown in red.
Source: J. Visser, ICTWSS Database, Version 4, 2013; Eurofound, 2014a.
Prevailing bargaining regime 2008 and 2013
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reforms allow a role for ‘associations of
persons’ and many business-level
agreements are now being drawn up by
these associations established under the
provisions of the new rules on collective
bargaining. These associations may be
created by three-fifths of the workforce at
firm level, regardless of the total number
of employees in the company and without
imposing time limits on the duration of
the collective agreements. New social
movements and industrial relations actors
have also surfaced in Portugal, Romania
and Slovenia. 
Fall in collective bargaining
Other paradigmatic change has concerned
collective bargaining and its related
mechanisms: fewer extension
mechanisms, more opt-out and
derogation clauses, and less continuation
of collective agreements on expiry.
Eurofound has identified another
dimension of decentralisation through the
abolition of the ‘favourability principle’:
the reversal of this principle in some
Member States now often accords
workplace agreements priority over
higher-level agreements (Eurofound
2013b; Schulten, 2013). However, some
Member States had already made earlier
changes to the ‘favourability principle’
(for example, France) or to the
introduction or increased use of opening
clauses that were not directly linked to the
crisis (for example, Germany). Some
Member States cater for mechanisms of
automatic continuation of collective
agreements on expiry – for example,
Spain (ultraactividad), Greece
(metenergeia) and Portugal
(sobrevigencia). These automatic
prolongations have been revised in
several Member States. 
A combination of the above changes and
the difficult general economic and
financial environment led to a drop in the
overall volume of bargaining, as well as to
the conclusion of agreements of shorter
duration, deemed to be more suited to the
changing economic climate in uncertain
times. It was argued that some of the
above changes were necessary to increase
the capacity of existing wage-setting
arrangements to respond quickly and
adequately to these changes. 
New European economic
governance and wage-
setting
There is considerable variation between
Member States in the extent to which
wage-setting mechanisms have been
subject to change. Change has been
concentrated among six Member States
whose wage-setting mechanisms have
each undergone multiple changes:
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Romania and Spain. In a further four
countries, there have been some changes
to wage-setting mechanisms: Croatia,
Hungary, Italy and Slovenia. Wage-setting
mechanisms in a majority of Member
States have seen fewer changes since
2008, or none. The reasons for this
stability include the relatively muted
impact of the crisis in some Member
States, the marginal role of collective
bargaining to wage-setting in a few
Member States and the capacity of
existing wage-setting arrangements to
respond to abrupt change in economic
conditions triggered by the crisis
(Eurofound, 2014a; Glassner et al, 2011). 
Government intervention
Some trends in decentralisation, such as
the increased use of opening and opt-out
clauses, were much more likely to result
from negotiations between the social
partners than from intervention by
governments. Other changes involved
clear governmental action and tended to
mark a departure from existing
arrangements. Government decisions
were also to the fore in the changes to
minimum wage-setting and indexation
mechanisms that have taken place among
a wider range of countries. In some
Member States, the intervention of
governments has recently resulted in an
increase of minimum wage protection –
for example, Croatia, Germany, Slovakia
and Slovenia. While the impact of the
memorandums of understanding (MoUs)
accompanying the financial assistance
programmes on inducing changes to
wage-setting mechanisms is clear, the
influence of country-specific
recommendations (CSRs) under the EU’s
new European Semester macroeconomic
planning regime is more variable.
Nonetheless, as with requirements under
the MoUs, a noticeable feature of the
CSRs is the emphasis they place on
collective wage-setting becoming more
decentralised. 
Scale of adjustment
On the question of whether the severity of
the impact of the crisis can be linked to
industrial relations typologies, a case
could be made that Member States in the
Mediterranean cluster appear to have
changed more than those in the Nordic or
central European groups. It is, of course,
difficult to disentangle the different
threads here: the Member States in which
the impact of the crisis has been most
severe on industrial relations are also
those where the crisis has had the most
acute economic impact. The social
partners in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain, for example, have had little room
for manoeuvre, given the scale of the
economic adjustments these countries
have had to make. Finally, academic
experts argue that the industrial relations
systems of Nordic and Central countries
contain more potential flexibility for
actors and processes (such as opening
clauses in collective agreements),
enabling them to adapt more readily to
changes in the economic environment. 
Christian Welz and David Foden
Note: This article is an abridged version of a
background document prepared by Eurofound
as a contribution to the informal EPSCO
meeting in Riga on 22–23 April 2015. The full
paper is available on request from
cwe@eurofound.europa.eu
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When relaunching social dialogue at a
high-level conference in Brussels in
March 2015, the European
Commission acknowledged the role of
social partners – specifically, their
active participation and their
involvement in all policies. In the EU
context, social partners are viewed as
an asset that – in respect of the
principle of autonomy and
subsidiarity – can make a contribution
to achieving a safer working
environment, more and better jobs,
and support for employment and
growth. Where do micro and small
companies fit into this picture? What
are the factors that can lead to the
development of good working
conditions, a favourable health and
safety environment and robust social
dialogue in small businesses – and
how can this lead to a win–win
situation for all involved? 
The EU Better Regulation and REFIT
programme has drawn attention to the
environment in which (in particular) small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
have to operate. The programmes
launched a debate to reflect on whether
some elements of directives relating to
social dialogue and the involvement of
social partners – including on health and
safety and information and consultation –
are an unnecessary administrative
burden.3
Research lacking
Micro and small companies are crucial in
terms of Europe’s economic development
and job creation: in the period 2002–
2010, some 85% of all new jobs created in
the EU were in SMEs and nearly six out
of ten were micro companies. Given this,
it is surprising that very little research has
been conducted into social dialogue in
these companies as a way of contributing
to good working conditions. Findings from
Eurofound’s fifth European Working
Conditions Survey indicate that micro
companies have the highest proportion of
workers who report they are ‘not very
well’ or ‘not at all well’ informed about
health and safety risks; according to
national surveys, in workplaces with
employee representation structures the
workers enjoy better working conditions
than where there is no representation
(Eurofound, 2012a). Eurofound’s third
European Company Survey found that
26% of small establishments had an
official employee representation structure
and nearly one-third of employee
representatives in micro companies said
they had no influence on management
decisions in the area of occupational
safety and health (OSH)
(Eurofound, 2015d).
Eurofound research into social dialogue in
micro and small companies has
investigated social dialogue and labour
relations in these companies, examined
relevant legislative changes at Member
State level, identified examples of good
practice where social dialogue has worked
well and analysed the drivers of success.
OSH concerns
General workplace representation
structures are present in micro and small
companies in 22 Member States. Trade
union representatives tend to be more
prevalent than elected representatives;
they also often carry out OSH duties in
these companies. Employee
representation bodies are often more
prevalent in micro or small
establishments belonging to a larger
company or group, which exercises an
‘invisible’ influence in the type of
governance. The work of employee
interest representation bodies at company
level is extremely demanding: SMEs tend
to have a works council chair on a
part-time basis and there is a lack of
personnel support resources. In many
micro and small companies, the manager
of the company is responsible for OSH
management; as the manager is often not
qualified in this area, outside company
support has to be brought in. The
increased need for external structures of
support, information and advice on
working conditions over the years may
explain the lower identification with
health and safety concerns in the
company. 
There are public policies to foster
tripartite involvement (with public
authorities and social partners) in micro
and small companies – in terms of OSH
policies, national strategies, sectoral-level
safety partnership initiatives (in the
construction sector, for instance), or
coaching on OSH in the sector.
Sectoral-level initiatives can take
advantage of the social partners’ greater
knowledge of sector-specific situations.
Relevant in this context also are the
interprofessional training funds for
financing the territorial-level training
plans of micro and small companies. 
Company size
The study findings confirm that the
presence of collective bargaining,
company agreements and representation
structures increases with the size of the
company, but it is very difficult to map the
general patterns of quality of social
dialogue in micro and small companies.
In some instances, the lack of formal
structures could be compensated for by
direct dialogue between employer and
employee: there are some indications that
the smaller the company, the more open
and confidential the relations between
employees and employer. A considerable
number of micro and small companies
operate outside the established
participation model. It should be noted as
well that the low level of trade union
density and reduced company
membership in employer associations is
Social dialogue in micro and
small companies
13
3 The REFIT Platform was set up by a Decision of
19 May 2015 to conduct an ongoing dialogue with
Member States and stakeholders on improving
EU legislation in the context of the Regulatory
Fitness and Performance Programme.
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In conclusion, working conditions in
small businesses are characterised by
great variation with industrial relations
often taking place in an informal,
unstructured way. Putting in place the
necessary resources to overcome the
difficulties faced by small businesses is
crucial in order to gain real improvements
in the quality of working conditions and
industrial relations. Different actors have
to work together to achieve joint interests,
arrive at a shared understanding of the
expectations of a win–win situation, and
foster acceptance, mutual trust and
understanding. An open-minded
approach on the part of both employers
and employees can facilitate a strong and
pragmatic orientation towards problem-
solving. Making the case that better
working conditions through social
dialogue can lead to better performance
and recognising that the good health of
the workforce is also good for business
remain a challenge, which all actors – the
research world and the social partners –
have to address. 
Jean-Michel Miller
not the best starting point to formalise an
operational practice of structured social
dialogue. Although it is not good to
generalise, it could be stated that micro
and small companies contain
simultaneously elements of the best and
the worst examples of social dialogue.
While OSH is one of the most important
issues of social dialogue in micro and
small companies, such companies
frequently have less knowledge and fewer
resources to deal with OSH. The research
findings indicate in micro and small
companies, that less training is offered,
there is less knowledge of the role of OSH
representatives and there are fewer
workplace assessments.
Good practice examples
The good practice examples reveal that a
participatory style of leadership and
management applied by the
owner/manager, one based on mutual
respect, is favourable for the development
of social dialogue. Similarly, a type of
work organisation based on teamwork,
combined with a high degree of autonomy
and responsibility for the individual
worker, is most conducive to a more
cooperative atmosphere based on
common interests. Another influencing
factor is a company business model and
competition strategy based on the quality
of products/services and not solely on
grounds of competition on the basis of
prices and costs. Without doubt,
companies face increased competition (in
particular from low-cost competitors) but
reputation and quality remain winning
factors in a market where the consumer
has become more critical in their
decision-making. These company internal
and external factors can influence the
development of a sound social dialogue in
a win–win strategy. 
The current trend towards the
decentralisation of industrial relations and
collective bargaining has affected social
dialogue in micro and small companies
much more than in larger companies:
ultimately, workers could elect to work in
companies covered by collective
bargaining rather than companies that are
not in order to ensure better protection
and working conditions for themselves.
Good practice is very much shaped by the
national industrial relations context and
labour relations culture, which can either
favour or obstruct social dialogue at
company level.
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and provide better protection for the
leaders of trade unions and works
councils. 
In Luxembourg, after signing a bilateral
agreement with employer representatives,
and another with trade unions, the
Luxembourg government has been
encouraging the social partners to revert
to the country’s former tradition of
tripartite consultation. At the same time,
tripartite meetings have been held as part
of the framework process of organising the
national response to the European
Semester.
Similar debates have been underway in
Finland, focusing on the role of social
partners in the traditional tripartite
setting. For over a year, the peak-level
social partners have been in bilateral
negotiations regarding a renewal of the
collective bargaining system. In February
2015, the dialogue ended in deadlock due
to disagreements on how to avoid illegal
strikes. Negotiations to reform the social
dialogue structure were expected to
continue alongside the developments
following the parliamentary election in
April 2015. However, the new
government, which took office in May,
immediately put pressure on the social
partners. In a move that is at odds with
the Finnish tradition of tripartite
consensus, the government has
threatened to introduce additional
austerity measures if the social partners
do not agree to a ‘social contract’ to
improve the country’s competitiveness.
Reinforcing bipartism
In Sweden, social partners have discussed
ways to reinforce the bipartite model. On
3 October 2014, the Confederation of
Swedish Enterprise (SN) and the Swedish
Trade Union Confederation (LO) made a
joint declaration to mark the opening of
negotiations about how the Swedish
model of social dialogue might be revised.
Their stated position is that social
partners – and not politicians – should
Social dialogue – whether conducted
through tripartite concertation or
bipartite dialogue in the Member
States – is concerned with more than
just topical issues: it also involves
efforts to establish, readapt and revise
the system of industrial relations.
Eurofound’s most recent comparative
analysis of developments in collective
bargaining in Europe found that most
legislative changes made over the past
two decades have in fact bolstered the
collective bargaining process
(Eurofound, forthcoming). This article
– based on contributions from
Eurofound’s network of European
correspondents – selects the most
recent reforms and debates that are
currently underway in the EU
Member States.4
Strengthening tripartitism
Reforms of the industrial relations system
are often made against a background of
attempts to resolve deadlocks in
concertation. In Lithuania, Malta, Poland
and Romania, this has involved reforming
the tripartite bodies with a view to
strengthening tripartitism.
In the Czech Republic, the role of social
partners was strengthened after the Czech
government, in December 2014, changed
the procedural rules for preparing
legislation and statutory regulations.
Under the new rules, the comments of
social partners to draft regulations and
guidance will be forwarded to the relevant
Deputy Ministers who have proposed the
amendments to the legislation; the
government’s Legislative Council is
obliged to discuss the comments and
address possible conflicts. 
In Poland, following a long-standing
stalemate in social dialogue, the deadlock
seems to have been overcome. New
tripartite bodies – with an increased scope
of responsibility – began operations in
early 2015. Under draft legislation, it is
proposed that a Social Dialogue Council
will replace the Tripartite Commission on
Social and Economic Affairs. 
In Malta, a working group has proposed
changes in the structure of the tripartite
national institution for social dialogue –
the Malta Council for Economic and
Social Dialogue (MCESD). Its key
recommendation was that MCESD should
have administrative and financial
autonomy. The working group also
recommended that MCESD move away
from the Ministry for Social Dialogue in
order to assert its independence. 
In Romania, further amendments to the
law governing the Economic and Social
Council (CES) aim to unlock social
dialogue at sectoral level and revive
tripartite dialogue through the National
Tripartite Committee for Social Dialogue.
Another goal is to enforce dialogue within
the CES with third parties representing
civic society (similar to that operating in
the European Economic and Social
Committee). 
In Lithuania, proposals for a new social
dialogue model were put forward in
December 2014 and presented at the
Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania
(LRS) in May 2015. Under the new
model, the current main national tripartite
social dialogue institution, the Tripartite
Council of the Republic of Lithuania
(LRTT), would be replaced by the
National Council. Moreover, the status of
employer organisations would be defined
by legislation, which should also establish
representativeness criteria for social
partner organisations, regulate relations
between work councils and trade unions,
Social dialogue, tripartitism and
bipartism at national level
4 See http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork. 
The information is based on contributions received up to
1 April 2015.
15
ef1537en_Layout 1  25/09/2015  07:41  Page 15
continue to be the key actors in regulating
working conditions in the Swedish labour
market.
At the same time, in France, reform of the
funding of social dialogue has been
proceeding. The Law of 5 March 2014 on
Professional Training, Employment and
Social Democracy provided for the
creation of a new fund to support trade
union and employer organisations in
‘their role in the management of bipartite
bodies (paritarism) and their participation
in the design of public policy’. A decree of
31 January 2015 set out rules for how the
fund would operate. Social partners in
France have also recently expressed the
need to discuss the future of national
bargaining more generally, following the
breakdown in January of negotiations on
modernising social dialogue (on the
‘quality and effectiveness of social
dialogue in companies and improving
worker representation’).
Reforming collective
bargaining
A new law on the ‘Promotion of collective
bargaining autonomy’ came into force in
Germany in August 2014, introducing a
new mechanism for simplifying the
extension of sectoral minimum wage
agreements. Previously, a collective
agreement could only be declared
generally binding if it covered more than
50% of the employees in a sector. Under
the new law, the prerequisite for an
extension is the condition that it is ‘of
public interest’; this will be the case if the
agreement is vital for the protection of
working conditions in a sector or for
combating economic ‘maldevelopment’ –
for instance, to prevent wage dumping. In
March 2015, the bill on ‘Collective
bargaining unity’ (Tarifeinheit) was
introduced in parliament, stipulating that
if more than one trade union concludes a
collective agreement covering the same
group of workers, only the agreement of
the trade union that has the relative
majority of members should be
applicable. This has triggered a heated
debate on whether the act will impact on
the right of small trade unions to conclude
applicable agreements and to go on strike. 
For more information, see
Eurofound (2015e).
Christine Aumayr-Pintar
European works councils (EWCs)
provide transnational information and
consultation mechanisms for
employee representatives in
multinational companies (MNCs). In
organising meetings between central
management and employee
representatives from the EU Member
States in which the companies
operate, the EWC builds a bridge
between the headquarters where
strategic decisions are made and the
workplaces where these decisions
have a concrete impact on employees.
This bridge-building takes place
across different cultures, interests and
levels. As there are information and
consultation mechanisms at European
level, and also at workplace level, the
way these different levels work
together determines their efficiency.
Legal framework
The information and consultation
Directive (94/45/EC) applies to companies
that have at least 1,000 employees in the
European Economic Area, and 150 or
more in at least two EU Member States
(European Parliament, 2002). These
companies are obliged to establish an
EWC or some kind of agreed European
mechanism for information and
consultation, if employee representatives
of at least two EU Member States request
this. An EWC is established through
negotiations with employee
representatives from the MNC’s European
operations in a special negotiating body
(SNB); this results in an EWC agreement
establishing the terms of operation of the
EWC. Only when the parties cannot come
to such an agreement are the standard
rules (the subsidiary requirements)
applied. There is no doubt that having the
subsidiary requirements in the
background boosted the conclusion of
voluntary agreements in the years before
the entry into force of the national
transpositions of the 1994 EWC directive
in September 1996. 
The EWC directive has evolved to become
an important instrument of compliance
with the European standards and
practices shaping the European Social
Model. After 10 years of attempts to
amend the EWC directive, on 6 May 2009
a recast EWC directive was adopted
(2009/38/EC). By June 2016, the
European Commission will present a
report assessing the implementation of the
recast directive.
Window of opportunity
The period between the adoption of the
recast directive in June 2009 and the entry
into force of its national transpositions in
June 2011 provided a window of
opportunity to conclude new EWC
agreements, discharging those EWCs and
MNCs from the obligations of the recast
EWC directive. The window of
opportunity aimed to respect the
autonomy of the social partners. It did not
raise the number of newly established
EWCs, as it had done in the period before
the entry into force of the national
transpositions of the 1994 EWC directive
in September 1996. There appear to have
been fewer new EWCs established each
year since 2009, compared with previous
years; the recast EWC directive, however,
aims to facilitate the process of
establishing new EWCs, by making
information on the scope of a company
more easily available to local workplace
representatives and making local
management responsible for disclosing
this information in each workplace. In
addition, the recast directive has provided
for crucial support to SNBs in terms of
granting an employee-only preparation
meeting for SNB members, training for
SNB members, as well as notification of
ongoing negotiations to European trade
unions and their expert assistance in SNB
meetings.
A recent report from Eurofound, based on
10 longitudinal case studies, indicates
that the window of opportunity did indeed
trigger a considerable number of
renegotiations of the agreements of
existing EWCs (Eurofound, 2015a). There
is, however, no evidence that the recast
directive made these EWCs more effective
within the period of the window of
opportunity, since this could have
happened before 2009, and also after
2012. It may be that some of the EWCs
Building bridges:
20 years of EWCs
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had no real scope to become more
effective, perhaps having already
developed beyond the previous legal
minimum requirements. This could be
due to their having already implemented
provisions on the training of EWC
members, holding more than one annual
plenary meeting or having further fine-
tuned their information and consultation
mechanisms. The potential impact of the
recast directive had thus already occurred
in part in these EWCs before it was
adopted. As the case studies were based
on interviews conducted in 2012, there is
no evidence to show the recast directive
has had an influence on the development
of EWCs after 2012. 
In any case, the legal developments that
clearly influenced EWCs most in terms of
their composition, representativeness and
functional requirements were the
successive enlargements of the EU and
the subsequent European expansion of
MNCs: these led to an increase in the
number of employee representatives from
different countries in EWCs.
Impact of the crisis
None of the cases studied illustrates a
direct impact of the crisis in terms of a
reduction in EWC activities, such as
cancelling or postponing an EWC
meeting. EWCs were indirectly affected
through company changes that the crisis
set in motion. The companies hardest hit
by the crisis were those in the financial
sector, but substantial changes also
occurred in some companies prior to and
independently of the crisis. While such
restructuring challenged EWCs, it also
offered some an opportunity to clarify
their information and consultation
procedures.
As regards other factors, the study
investigated whether the size of the
MNC’s workforce and the degree of its
internationalisation might also have a
bearing on the development of EWCs. In
terms of the degree of internationalisation,
a greater number of companies in an
MNC means a greater number of
countries from which representatives must
be included in the EWC. Regarding
workforce size, delegates from countries
with smaller workforces do not have the
same opportunities as representatives
from the home country or from countries
with larger workforces to participate in
and contribute to the development of the
EWC. The study also found that the more
internationalised the management
decision-making or the smaller the
workforce in the MNC’s home country,
the greater the level of interest of home-
country employee representatives in the
EWC’s activities. Opportunities for EWCs
to autonomously develop a proper
European identity are improved when the
key roles on both the management and
employee representative sides are given to
delegates from countries other than the
home country. Certain company
characteristics and how these change can
influence developments in the
composition or functioning of EWCs.
However, for the companies in this study,
this has been more of an ongoing trend
than a result of the recast directive or of
the recent crisis.
Fine-tuning the parameters
Renegotiations of EWC agreements offer
the opportunity to fine-tune the
parameters of an EWC in terms of its
composition, the number of meetings, the
duration of the meetings, the internal
structure or the role of the select
committee. The report shows that the
largest potential impact of an agreement
renegotiation on the functioning of an
EWC can occur when it is triggered by
mergers or acquisitions of companies that
both have EWCs already. Company
changes can also increase the turnover
among EWC membership, potentially
impeding the development of cooperation,
which is central to the effectiveness of the
EWC.
The research shows that the investment
and efforts that employee representatives
and management make to develop an
EWC depend on how they assess its
function. Most of the significant
developments in the functioning of the
EWCs studied were due to the continuous
efforts of committed EWC members to
overcome cultural differences, challenge
company changes and resolve them
through increasing cooperation, building
trust and seeking a common
understanding of the appropriate ways for
the EWC to handle change.
As for the management perspective,
interesting developments were reported
for two companies where a European
human resource network was developed
in parallel to the EWC. This demonstrates
that the efforts made by management and
employee representatives to further
develop their EWCs can benefit both
sides. The practices presented in the EWC
case studies in the report are examples of
innovative industrial relations practices in
a win–win context.
For more, read Eurofound (2015a),
European Works Council developments
before, during and after the crisis.
Peter Kerckhofs
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Financial turmoil and the increasing
globalisation of value chains have
focused attention on how to stimulate
economies across Europe by
revitalising industrial policy.
However, existing policy instruments
need to be aligned to the realities of
global competition and evolving
technologies. The role of the state in
this process is crucial, but it is clear
the social partners also have a role to
play. What instruments of industrial
policy are currently used in Europe?
What is the role of social dialogue
and of the social partners in shaping
them? How can social dialogue play a
proactive role in the current
landscape of policymaking?
Based on findings from a study by
Eurofound’s network of European
correspondents, a Eurofound report, Role
of social dialogue in industrial policies,
sought to answer these questions. Its
analysis is supplemented by interviews
carried out with representatives of both
sides of industry in six selected sectors:
automotive, defence, food, chemicals,
steel, and textiles.
Policy framework 
The Europe 2020 Strategy has an explicit
focus on industry and puts forward a
modern industrial policy for Europe,
calling for close collaboration between
different sectoral stakeholders at both
European and national level. The 2012
Commission Communication A stronger
European industry for growth and
economic recovery set out a new approach
to the EU’s industrial policy by
delineating clear and concrete measures
that combine both horizontal and
selective policies in a strategic manner.
The 2014 Commission Communication
For a European industrial renaissance
affirms that a strong industrial base is
central to the recovery of the European
economy and its position in the global
market, pointing to the key role of the
Member States and other relevant actors
in implementing reforms.
Focus on recovery,
innovation and restructuring 
Industrial policy appears to have reignited
across many EU Member States in the
aftermath of the crisis, as a strategy to re-
activate growth, create jobs and foster
productivity. Belgium, Luxembourg and
Spain were shown to have comprehensive
industrial policy strategies (with a cross-
sectoral focus) to drive recovery from the
crisis and bring about innovation and
industrial growth. Other countries have
introduced horizontal policy initiatives
aimed at increasing competitiveness or
fostering technological innovation. 
The industrial policy instruments in place
in the Member States can be categorised
in two main groups: horizontal or cross-
sectoral instruments, and those applicable
to selected sectors. The former can be
related to specific themes or policy
domains, such as training and education,
manufacturing and productivity, tax and
trade. The latter (targeted or sectoral)
industrial policy instruments are aimed at
strengthening specific strategic productive
sectors and can involve channelling
investment in research and development
(R&D) into specific technologies or
products, creating jobs in the entire value
chain, attracting skilled labour in specific
sectors, and increasing the technical skills
profile of the workforce to meet the needs
of strategic sectors. 
While innovation appears to be a key
component of the emerging industrial
policy agenda, there is substantial
variation in the way this is pursued by
Member States. Some national policies
include a focus on SMEs (as in the Czech
Republic) or a regional dimension, such
as Denmark’s regional councils and
clusters of companies in Austria and
Romania. 
Restructuring and its effects are often
linked with industrial policies. Most of the
national examples come from the central
and eastern European countries and often
include funding from European regional
and development funds. An example from
Poland illustrates a joint effort by the
social partners to put in place a
restructuring programme. 
Degree of involvement
Overall, social partners’ involvement in
the industrial policymaking process
(particularly that of trade unions) has
been quite limited. Examples of consistent
and robust involvement in industrial
policy emerge from countries belonging to
the so-called ‘social partnership regime’ of
industrial relations: Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Slovenia. However, during the crisis
even the Nordic countries – which usually
display high levels of tripartitism in the
process of policy development – have
seen these arrangements come under
pressure. Those countries particularly
affected by the sovereign debt crisis
demonstrate a very low degree of social
partner involvement. In the central and
eastern European countries, involvement
is mixed: some countries (such as Estonia
and Romania) benefit from social partner
engagement in the process, leading to
robust industrial policy initiatives; others
(such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia) show limited engagement even
when structures are already in place. 
The study shows that the degree of social
partner involvement in industrial policy at
national level is influenced by the
institutional characteristics of the
industrial relations regimes in those
countries and is more substantial in the
formulation of horizontal policy initiatives
than in targeted, sectoral initiatives.
With the evolution of the European
industrial policy agenda, the number and
type of industrial policy instruments
initiated at EU level has expanded greatly.
Focusing on six sectors at EU level –
automotive, defence, food, chemicals,
steel and textiles – the study found that
innovation policy and R&D are the most
widely used instruments. The most
encompassing form of social partner
involvement is that of high-level groups,
essentially multi-stakeholder groups,
which overall are favourably viewed by
the social partners. 
Role of social dialogue in industrial policy 
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Agenda shift
In terms of the role of European sectoral
social dialogue in industrial policy, it
appears that there is a shift in the agenda
setting: while training and adapting the
skills base and the social consequences of
restructuring are still important, other
issues such as innovation, access to raw
materials, R&D and access to finance
have risen higher on the agenda,
enlarging the scope of the European
sectoral social dialogue committees.
Moreover, the social partners have
produced joint reports and taken own
initiatives on industrial policies, which
have facilitated policymaking. 
Involving the social partners in
formulating and implementing policy at
both national and European level can
harness expertise and experience in
labour market, social and industry
domains, which in turn can increase the
robustness, relevance and timeliness of
industrial policy initiatives. 
Overall, the analysis points to the
potentially increased importance of social
dialogue in industrial policies, but it also
calls for new ways of working for both
policymakers and social partners. 
Harnessing strengths from
both sides
The study points to the ongoing pressures
of globalisation and the economic crisis,
which have put social dialogue under
strain and created a tendency for
governments to decide and implement
interventions very quickly, often without
properly consulting the social partners.
This is particularly evident where sectoral
initiatives are taken. 
For policies to be robust, coherent and
effective, national instruments should
benefit from the social partners’ industry-
specific knowledge and enhance
awareness and alignment among social
partners and other industry actors. Trade
unions can provide important insights
into the skills of the labour force, and
their involvement will facilitate the
commitment of workers to political goals
and objectives and help foster innovative
approaches from the shop floor up.
Employer organisations can bring
valuable data and analysis of the
dynamics at the policy level. The positive
results of European sectoral social
dialogue in the sectors examined call for a
sharing of that experience among all
interested sectors and the use of their
outcomes at policymaking level.
One way of developing industrial policies
so that they address the challenges of
globalisation is to introduce a systemic
approach that can encompass a variety of
instruments and work across sectors. In
developing such an approach, the
knowledge of the social partners can be
crucial – as it is for the implementation of
programmes as well. 
With ambitious social and environmental
goals set at EU level and in the face of
common problems confronting European
industries (not least, scarce natural and
energy resources), the coordination of
industrial policies at EU and national
level can contribute to a true European
industrial renaissance.
Stavroula Demetriades
Note: This article is a summary of the report
Role of social dialogue in industrial policies
(Eurofound, 2014b); a version of it was
previously published in the EU Social Dialogue
Newsletter No. 6 – March 2014. 
19
ef1537en_Layout 1  25/09/2015  07:41  Page 19
Despite the almost 60-year-old
commitment to the goal, gender
equality is far from being achieved in
the European Union. The ‘moving
targets’ – labour market participation,
employment and unemployment rates,
and other quantified objectives – do
not make attaining gender equality
across Europe any easier.
Furthermore, there has been, at least
in some academic and social circles,
an evolution regarding the nature of
the measures to be taken, with some
experts suggesting that it might be
better to shift from women-focused
measures to more encompassing ones,
addressing the situation of both men
and women.
Role of social partners
Social partners, as with other key actors
in society and policymaking positions,
have a crucial role to play in improving
the overall situation of equality –
specifically gender equality, both in
society at large and, particularly, at the
workplace. As Eurofound’s report on
Social partners and gender equality in
Europe confirms, national peak-level
social partner organisations have been to
the fore in promoting gender equality,
albeit by focusing more on external
actions affecting the labour market and
wider society and less on internal
structures (Eurofound, 2014c). 
The message stemming from the EU
regulations could not be clearer: social
dialogue between the social partners is
extremely important for the promotion of
equal treatment of men and women in
matters of employment and occupation.
It is part of the recast Equal Treatment
Directive (Directive 2006/54/EC), which
consolidates in a single text all the rules
and case law of the European Court of
Justice relating to equal opportunities and
equal treatment for men and women in
employment and occupation. This has
been followed up by the ongoing
commitment shown by the European
cross-industry social partners to tackle
gender inequality in work and
employment. 
Policy approaches
While the issue of persistent segregation
in the labour markets is easy to grasp, the
main difficulty regarding gender equality
is defining the concept, which naturally
has implications for the type of policy
measures needed to address the issue.
Some gender equality measures focus on
‘equality of opportunity’ while others
focus on ‘equality of outcomes’. The
former see gender equality as part of
broader diversity and inclusion strategies
with the objective of ensuring equal rights
and opportunities for all, irrespective of
gender. In the latter, the definition focuses
more on the concept of equality of
outcomes, where gender equality depends
on the comparison of results achieved by
women and men (for example, in terms of
representation or pay).
Nevertheless, social partner organisations
do not apply such a clear-cut distinction
when devising measures, tending to
pursue and implement an amalgam of
concepts and policies.
Country differences
In terms of the priorities of peak social
partner organisations, the research
identified three groups of countries. In a
handful of countries (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia and Poland), gender equality is not
a stated priority for social partner
organisations and therefore no specific
commitments have been developed. The
remaining Member States are split into
two groups: social partner organisations
having either ‘relatively well-developed
activities’ on gender equality issues (18
countries) and those with ‘unilateral
activities’ (6 countries). Interestingly, the
group with well-developed activities falls
into two categories. In the first, equality
issues feature among the strategic
objectives of at least one organisation of
each side of industry. In the second, the
importance given to gender issues extends
across all partners: this is the case in
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the
UK. Unilateral activities are mainly
developed by trade union organisations. 
It is worth stressing that, beyond the
general level of engagement on gender
equality issues (measured, for example,
through the Gender Equality Index
developed by the European Institute for
Gender Equality) and the specific features
Social partner organisations –
the long march towards
gender equality
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Focus Aim Policy commitments
Equal
opportunities
Ensuring equal rights and
opportunities for all based on
merit
l Ensuring access to the labour market and
appropriate skills for women and effective family-
friendly legislation
l Differences between men and women attributed to
gender identity acquired over the lifetime and
learning experience 
l Male norm remains the standard
Equality of
outcomes
Same results achieved by women
and men
l Supporting special measures to bring women to the
levels already reached by men (in pay, for example)
l Acknowledging that men and women have different
contributions in gender-segregated societies
l Special measures for the advancement of women
Source: Eurofound, 2014c
Different gender equality focus leads to different policy measures
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of different industrial relations systems,
the main reason for relatively low levels of
activity on gender equality issues is the
declining level of importance accorded to
those issues since the beginning of the
crisis. Despite the general buy-in to the
equality principle, it is seen by the social
partners as less deserving of prioritisation
when more pressing issues, such as the
risk of redundancy and policy changes
affecting working conditions, are on the
agenda. 
Positive actions
There is a growing awareness that
promoting gender equality within the
social partner organisations themselves
can positively affect the shaping of
external policies while setting a good
example for the wider labour market. 
Many organisations have a specific body
or department responsible for gender
issues. This is the case in trade unions in
21 Member States and in employer
organisations in seven. These
departments, reflecting the importance
given to gender equality issues by the
organisations, can play a key role in
facilitating gender mainstreaming, both
within the organisations and in activities
related to collective bargaining. In many
other cases, social partner organisations
(mostly trade unions) have developed and
implemented several measures to promote
internal gender equality. For example,
some organisations have introduced
quota systems. Despite being a very
controversial measure, the quota systems
aim to bring more women into decision-
making roles and to balance the
participation of men and women in the
executive bodies. Trade unions in Austria,
Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and the UK have introduced such
measures. 
Some organisations implement gender-
awareness training activities on collective
bargaining negotiations, social dialogue or
policymaking in general. Other
organisations, again mainly trade unions,
have been introducing family-friendly
enhanced policies for their own staff,
sometimes even emphasising the family-
leave rights of fathers or measures
favouring a good work–life balance. The
development of handbooks or guidelines
is also part of the relatively limited range
of activities. 
Road blocks in the way
Nevertheless, there are many hurdles
preventing the social partners from
achieving a more balanced participation
of women and men in decision-making
roles and from implementing effective
gender equality actions, particularly
internally. Apart from scant resources and
limited knowledge on how to promote
gender equality, social partner
organisations face other significant
challenges. 
The removal of de jure barriers to women
accessing decision-making positions in
social partner organisations has proven
insufficient because de facto barriers still
exist. A good example of the latter is the
lack of commitment and unwillingness to
prioritise gender equality issues – often
associated with the relatively small
representation of women in top positions
in the social partner structures. In
addition, there is also gender stereotyping
in relation to the roles of men and women
in social partner organisations: for
example, in sectors predominantly
occupied by men, it seems more difficult
for gender issues to find their way onto
the agenda. 
Other challenges are less visible. While
some social partner organisations
advocate a gender-neutral approach for
policies or programmes to avoid having
an unequal (even if unintended) outcome
on women and men, internally they
continue to accentuate stereotypes
regarding the division of roles of women
and men in society. The reality is that the
top-level decision-making positions in
social partner organisations are still
predominantly held by men: according to
data from the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Justice, women in
2014 held just 15% and 6% respectively of
presidential positions in workers’ and
employers’ national social partners’ peak
organisations (European Commission,
2015b). Moreover, there is a serious risk
of thinking that attaining equal
representation of women and men at a
decision-making level is synonymous with
achieving gender equality and
consequently overlooking the structures
on the ground that could encourage a
more balanced participation of men and
women. 
Uphill journey
The European Union still has a long way
to go on the road towards gender equality.
Social partner organisations are important
players but certainly not the only ones
that must embark on this journey to
achieve this goal. Public authorities also
have their part to play. Most importantly,
all women and men should be invited to
undertake this journey, revising their
respective roles and contributing to
promoting equality. 
Jorge Cabrita and Isabella Biletta
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From the Treaty of Paris onwards, it
took more than 30 years before the
next decisive step was taken to
promote Community social policy.
The roots of European social dialogue,
strictly speaking, date back to the
1970s, when the Community social
partners were consulted on
European-level issues on an ad hoc
basis.
In 1984, under the then French Minister
for Employment, Pierre Bérégovoy
(France holding the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers at the time), the
European social partners met three times
in a row in Val Duchesse, Belgium, in
order to discuss the possible outline of a
European social dialogue. The outcome of
these first meetings was not very
productive. The aspirations of the Union
of Industrial and Employers’
Confederations of Europe (UNICE, now
BusinessEurope) and the European Trade
Union Confederation (ETUC) with regard
to the objectives of the European social
dialogue were diametrically opposed.
While ETUC was striving to accomplish
full-fledged collective agreements, UNICE
did not want to go any further than
formulating general common orientations.
These conflicting positions have not
changed much in the course of the
development of a more sophisticated
European social dialogue. Some observers
also blame the failure of the ‘Bérégovoy
round’ on the dispersion of the social
partners who were invited to the talks. 
From 1985 onwards, at the initiative of
Commission President Jacques Delors,
social dialogue took on a more
autonomous and bipartite form in the
preparatory phase of the Single Market.
This fundamental change may be dated to
31 January 1985, when the EU-level
social partners were invited to participate
in a high-level meeting in Val Duchesse.5
In contrast to Bérégovoy, Jacques Delors
dispatched invitations only to the General
Secretariats of ETUC and UNICE. The
goal of the meeting was to reaffirm the
importance of the social partners in the
European integration process, which had
been relaunched with the implementation
of the Single Market programme. It was
Jacques Delors’ firm conviction that the
Single Market programme had to correlate
with a social dimension of the European
Community: the cornerstone of this social
Europe would be the European social
dialogue. For the first time, a President of
the European Commission took
responsibility for uniting the leading
social partners by giving them an
essential role in the multi-level game of
‘Community chess’.
This proved to be the first step in what
became known as the Val Duchesse
period of dialogue (1985–1993),
characterised by bipartite social partner
activities consisting mainly of joint
opinions, resolutions and declarations.
The Val Duchesse I delegation was
composed of 39 members: six from the
Commission, 18 trade union
representatives and 15 employer
representatives. UNICE had a stronger
preference for EU-level representatives
(having seven), whereas ETUC was
represented only by its president and the
secretary-general (two). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that all the
key Commission actors of the early phase
of the Val Duchesse process had a strong
trade union background. Delors was a
former trade unionist with the French
Christian Workers’ Confederation (CFTC);
his social affairs adviser Patrick Venturini
and François Staedelin – later President of
the European Economic and Social
Committee and, according to Delors, one
of the ‘prime movers’ of the Val Duchesse
process – were affiliated with the French
Democratic Confederation of Labour
(CFDT); and finally, Jean Degimbe,
Director-General of DG Employment and
Social Affairs, had links with the Belgian
Christian trade unions. 
The social partners agreed to engage in
deepening the social dialogue. At a
second meeting, on 12 November 1985,
they decided to convene two joint working
groups: one on macroeconomics; and
another on social dialogue and the impact
of new technologies. The macroeconomic
working group produced a joint opinion
on the strategy of cooperation for growth
and employment (1986) and a yearly
economic report (1987). The social
dialogue and new technology working
group delivered a joint opinion on the
training, motivation, and information and
consultation of workers (1987). In
contrast to the tripartite conferences, the
Val Duchesse process focused on the
autonomous bipartite dialogue between
the social partners. The national
governments were largely eclipsed and the
role of the Commission was that of a
catalyst and interface between
management and labour. 
Val Duchesse – 
revisited
22 / Foundation Focus / issue 17 / September 2015
5 The castle of Val Duchesse is a former priory in
Auderghem in the Brussels Capital Region of
Belgium. Since the historic 1985 meeting, ‘Val
Duchesse’ has become synonymous with the
second phase of the European social dialogue and
its actual kick-off.
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The greatest achievement of the Val
Duchesse process, however, was the
outcome of the negotiations at Maastricht,
which produced the 1992 Treaty on the
European Union. Most of the substance
of the social provisions, which eventually
became the Agreement on Social Policy
(ASP) between 11 Member States, was the
result of negotiations initiated at Val
Duchesse and culminating in the
agreement dated 31 October 1991
between ETUC and UNICE/CEEP on a
new draft of Articles 118(4), 118A and
118B of the Treaty of Rome (now articles
154 and 155 TFEU). With few
modifications, the 11 Member States
adopted this agreement as the basis for
the future labour and social law of the
European Union. The social partners’
agreement of 31 October 1991 introduced
a fundamental paradigm shift in the
Community legislative process of social
policy and industrial relations. The ASP
instated the EU-level social partners as
co-legislators, a role which was formerly
reserved for Community institutions. Of
the then twelve EU Member States, only
the UK rejected the ASP, which gave rise
to a twin-track Europe in the field of
social policy and industrial relations. On
the first track, all twelve Member States
would continue to fall under the scope of
the commonly revised social provisions of
the EC Treaty. On the second track, by
agreement from all twelve Member States,
eleven Member States could adopt legal
acts on social policy and industrial
relations based on the ASP, including the
new social dialogue process. Despite the
installation of a twin-track social Europe,
the Protocol on Social Policy should be
seen as the culmination of the Val
Duchesse process, started in 1985, and as
one of the major accomplishments of the
former President of the European
Commission, Jacques Delors. The election
of a Labour Government in the UK in
May 1997 led the UK to opt in, and the
Treaty of Amsterdam, approved by the
European Council on 16 and 17 June
1997, provided for the provisions of the
ASP to be incorporated into the EC Treaty
(articles 138 and 139 EC), thus
terminating the Protocol on Social Policy. 
According to one commentator, it was
mainly the numerous British vetoes in the
social policy domain that incited Delors to
initiate this alternative approach of
policymaking through social dialogue
(Bercusson, 1995; Lapeyre, 2015). From
the Commission’s point of view, the Val
Duchesse process aimed at neutralising
opposition from some Member States to a
social dimension of the interior market by
activating the national and European
interest organisations for the common
European cause. This argument
corroborates the neo-functionalist
approach of interpreting the origins of
social dialogue as the paradigm of
cultivated spill-over – that is, political
engineering stemming from the European
Commission.6 At the same time, the Val
Duchesse process is also a piece of
evidence supporting the theoretical
assumption that mutual learning is a key
factor in the process of the
Europeanisation of industrial relations.
The intimate involvement of management
and labour in policy networks resulted in
a revised definition of interests and
preferences. Many of the personalities
representing management and labour at
Val Duchesse had never met their
counterparts from the other Member
States before. The Val Duchesse meetings
increased the convergence of both sides of
industry, which gradually started to
acknowledge the usefulness of social
partnership. This view is corroborated by
Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, the former
Secretary General of UNICE, who stated:
‘It is certain that without the learning
process provided by the “Joint Opinion”
phase, when the Social Partners really got
to know and respect each other, the
agreement of 31 October 1991 would
never have been reached’ (Tyszkiewicz,
1998). 
Christian Welz
Note: This article is an updated extract from
Welz (2008).
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6 Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional
integration.
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